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FOREWORD

This monograph examines the role of pseudo operations in several
foreign counterinsurgency campaigns. Pseudo operations are those
in which government forces disguised as guerrillas, normally along
with guerrilla defectors, operate as teams to inﬁltrate insurgent
areas. This technique has been used by the security forces of several
other countries in their operations, and typically it has been very
successful.
A number of factors must be taken into account before attempting
pseudo operations, especially their role in the intelligence and
operational systems. Although it is likely that most insurgent
movements have become more sophisticated, many of the lessons
learned from previous pseudo operations suggest their continued
usefulness in counterinsurgency campaigns.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Pseudo operations, in which government forces and guerrilla
defectors portray themselves as insurgent units, have been a very
successful technique used in several counterinsurgency campaigns.
Pseudo teams have provided critical human intelligence and other
support to these operations.
These operations, although of considerable value, also have raised a
number of concerns. Their use in offensive missions and psychological
operations campaigns has, at times, been counterproductive. In
general, their main value has been as human intelligence collectors,
particularly for long-term background intelligence or for identifying
guerrilla groups that then are assaulted by conventional forces. Care
must be taken in running these operations both to avoid going too
far in acting like guerrillas, and in resisting becoming involved in
human rights abuses.
Just who should control pseudo operations has been somewhat
contentious, but the teams typically have worked for police services
or intelligence agencies. This has been largely a result of weaknesses
in the military intelligence system. Ideally, strengthening military
intelligence structures to support pseudo operations would be the
best solution since it would provide better connectivity between the
pseudo teams and response forces.
Several factors have marked successful pseudo operations.
First has been a system of incentives for insurgents to defect to the
government. These incentives can be positive, usually monetary
rewards for surrendering; or negative, causing insurgents to cooperate
to avoid severe punishment. A mix of these forms has proven to be
very effective, with very few incidents of insurgents redefecting to
the guerrilla side. In general, the role of guerrilla defectors has been
critical in successful operations.
A critical environmental factor enabling pseudo team success
is weakness in insurgent command and communications systems.
Pseudo forces can thrive in environments in which guerrilla forces
have problems in their communications and in which centralized
control of the guerrilla groups has been weakened. Pseudo teams,
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in fact, can help create a synergistic cycle by further weakening
insurgent command and control, leading to even more opportunities
for their use.
The ﬁnal critical element of these operations is the effectiveness
of the response to the intelligence the teams collect, and coordination
with other government forces. Unless government response forces,
whether military, police, or intelligence services, are well-trained
and prepared to take full advantage of the intelligence provided by
pseudo teams, these operations are unlikely to have their maximum
impact. Also, unless secure systems are established to avoid
interference between the pseudo groups and other security forces,
the teams can be in as much danger from their own side as they are
from the insurgents.
Pseudo operation strategies used in earlier counterinsurgency
campaigns can offer valuable lessons for future missions. It is likely
that most guerrilla movements have become more sophisticated in
their operations; as a result, pseudo teams must also develop better
techniques. Still, the pseudo operations strategy should provide
major beneﬁts against insurgent groups.
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PSEUDO OPERATIONS AND COUNTERINSURGENCY:
LESSONS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES
The term “pseudo operations” (or some variant of it) indicates the
use of organized teams which are disguised as guerrilla groups for
long- or short-term penetration of insurgent-controlled areas. They
should be distinguished from the more common police or intelligence
inﬁltration of guerrilla or criminal organizations. In the latter case,
inﬁltration is normally done by individuals. Pseudo teams, on the
other hand, are formed as needed from organized units, usually
military or paramilitary.
The use of pseudo teams has been a hallmark of a number of
foreign counterinsurgency campaigns. In most cases, these operations
have been very successful. This monograph examines the record of
several of these cases, discusses some issues raised by these types of
operations, and suggests key lessons learned.
THE HUK INSURRECTION
An early example of pseudo-guerrillas was during the Huk
Insurrection in the Philippines from 1946-55. The principal unit to
be devoted to pseudo operations was the so-called Force X. The
group initially was formed in 1948 by members of the Philippine
Constabulary:
The basic idea was to make this specially trained force into a realistic
pseudo-Huk unit that could, in enemy guise, inﬁltrate deep into enemy
territory. The 47 initial members of Force X were dressed and equipped
like Huks. They were taught in a remote rain forest base to talk and act
like Huks by four captured guerrillas who had been “tested, screened,
and reindoctrinated to our side and brought to the training base to serve
as instructors.” The principal aim was to enable government forces to get
close enough to guerrilla forces to eliminate selected targets.1

One very successful mission of this type is worth describing for
an indication of how the Force X concept was used:
Accompanied by three military intelligence agents, a group of 20 former
Huks were inﬁltrated into [Panay’s] interior. After 3 months of gathering
1

information, establishing their cover as a bona ﬁde Huk unit, and
gaining the conﬁdence of the island’s Huk leadership, they hosted a “by
invitation only” barbecue for the Panay High Command. Between the
ribs and potato salad, the covert government force sprang an ambush
that killed or captured nearly all the Panay commanders and crippled the
organization on the island for the duration of the campaign.2

Beyond the assassination campaign against the Huk cadre, the
members of Force X also engaged in psychological operations and
various “dirty tricks” campaigns, to include planting doctored
ammunition in Huk ammunition caches that would explode when
ﬁred.3 They also were used for long-term intelligence collection.
A similar unit to Force X was established later in the anti-Huk
campaign. This was called Charlie Company. Due to the Huks’
awareness of earlier Force X operations, Charlie Company operations
normally did not involve actually trying to link with guerrilla groups.
Instead, they operated small team reconnaissance operations while
dressed either in uniform or in guerrilla disguises; in some cases, they
would also conduct “snatch” missions while dressed as guerrillas.4
MALAYA
During the same period, the British were conducting generally
similar pseudo operations in their campaign against the Malayan
Races Liberation Army (MRLA), a predominantly Chinese-based
insurgent group. This group was called “communist terrorists” (CTs)
by the British. Originally, the use of pseudo-guerrillas was bottom
driven, with police Special Branch ofﬁcers in the districts initiating
the teams.
One of these operations typiﬁed the use of pseudo teams. A
Special Branch ofﬁcer established links with a MRLA section leader
by arranging for his wife to deliver her baby in a government hospital.
After becoming closer to the leader, the Special Branch ofﬁcer made
a deal with him. The leader led a column of six insurgents out of the
jungle into a deliberate ambush in which the leader was carefully
identiﬁed ahead of time and spared. Chinese British soldiers then
donned the dead insurgents’ uniforms and were led back into the
jungle by the MRLA member. From there, they operated against
higher ranking members of the insurgency.5
2

Robert Thompson, one of the principal civilian architects of the
counterinsurgency campaign argued that the captured insurgents,
needed to “belong” to some organization in place of the Communism
they had renounced; he believed they tended to turn to other ex-CTs for
guidance in the new world into which they had just emerged . . . . [I]n
a strange way they could only justify their escape from Communism by
being personally involved in the struggle against it―which was why time
after time they begged to lead patrols back into the jungle to attack their
former comrades.6

Another author offered a more practical reason for the willingness
of captured or surrendered insurgents to cooperate: They needed
“to kill off all the Communists who knew them, and knew of their
defection or capture, before this news could be spread around
to the Traitor Killing Squads, which might extract retribution
from relatives.”7 Whether from practical considerations or more
complicated psychological factors, surrendered or captured MRLA
members tended to cooperate with British authorities once under
their control.
In Malaya, one aspect of dealing with surrendered or captured
guerrillas presented a difﬁculty that has surfaced in other campaigns.
Psychological operations campaigns stressed the good treatment of
surrendered insurgents in an effort to inspire others to surrender
voluntarily. For other guerrillas to believe this approach, however,
it was necessary to publicize the current satisfaction of those who
had already surrendered through photographs and broadcasts.8 This
approach, of course, conﬂicted with the requirement to keep hidden
the identities of those guerrillas who had agreed to cooperate as
pseudo-guerrillas.
The British also used pseudo-guerrillas for some psychological
operations including disguising some troops as MRLA members,
then launching a false bombing raid on their position. The troops
were made up to look wounded and then sent into areas where they
would encounter insurgents and spread tales of the effectiveness of
British targeting. In general, however, the pseudo teams were used
for intelligence collection and to target guerrilla camps for bombing
raids.
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KENYA AND THE MAU MAU
From 1952 to 1960, the British fought a counterinsurgency
campaign against the tribally-based insurgent group called the
Mau Mau in Kenya. The command and control system for British
operations in Kenya consisted of provincial headquarters, with
a provincial emergency committee consisting of police and army
representatives, and district committees established below them
with similar members.
The group with the principal responsibility for intelligence
collection was the Special Branch of the police rather than military
intelligence ofﬁcers. Due to the increased demands placed on Special
Branch by the Mau Mau operations, the army seconded sergeants
from the Kenya Regiment to serve as Field Intelligence Assistants
(FIAs). These FIAs were posted to “outlying parts” of the districts to
collect information.9
After the FIA system was established, the army headquarters then
began assigning some army ofﬁcers at the district level as District
Military Intelligence Ofﬁcers (DMIO) to work with the Special Branch
ofﬁcers. It was not until later in the counterinsurgency campaign
that an army ofﬁcer was assigned to Special Branch headquarters
to serve as the principal liaison to coordinate the operations of the
army and Special Branch nationally.10
Most of the ofﬁcers and noncommissioned ofﬁcers had little or no
formal intelligence training or background. Frank Kitson, who was
key in developing the concept of pseudo-guerrillas in Kenya, noted
the attitude of his superiors when he was appointed as a DMIO: “[I]f
we could not be of any use, could we please not be a nuisance?”11
Kitson’s original concept was simply to develop camps in which
the British “could keep a handful of Africans who could help [the FIA]
with his interrogations and who could move around the countryside
planting . . . and visiting informers.”12 In rather short order, however,
he discovered that captured Mau Mau were willing to work actively
against their former comrades. Former Mau Mau were used to train
British African troops and deployed with these troops in the ﬁeld
against the insurgents. As with Malaya, the initial deployment of the
pseudo-guerrillas was bottom driven, with ofﬁcial approval from
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the British headquarters following only after a number of operations
had been run. In about a year, the original small pseudo group had
grown to a force of about 200.13
These teams were used primarily to collect long-term information
and intelligence since, as Kitson notes, “. . . if we always directed
Security Forces onto gangs immediately after visiting them, the
terrorists would soon tumble to the idea.”14 It was only when a
particularly valuable target was encountered that the teams would
launch direct attacks, unless, of course, a team came under immediate
threat. Even when the pseudo teams (normally called “pseudo gangs”
by the British) launched direct operations against insurgent groups,
they typically tried to capture as many as possible rather than to kill
them.
One tool that proved very useful in identifying Mau Mau
members―a number of whom then were turned to the government’s
side―was the “hooded man” system:
The Coleman Scheme was to have many more hooded men than Special
Branch had used. He wanted at least 10 each time and possibly more
. . . The FIA would then disguise the man before he came into contact
with the other hooded men, some of whom might be prisoners rather
than informers. When they were all safely hidden behind their masks,
they would be assembled and sat down in a row of chairs, with one of
our men standing behind each one. No hooded man was allowed to talk
to another . . . When all was ready, the suspects would walk past the
hooded men. If they recognized anyone they would give brief particulars
to the FIA standing behind their chair. If a suspect was recognized by
three or four of the hooded men and if the particulars given to the FIAs
corresponded, then it was a safe assumption that they had picked the
right man. In this way, we collected a lot of information about people,
and we also caught many senior Mau Mau supporters. Quite often we
would even get active gangsters in the net.15

Although Kitson admitted that it was a “gross oversimpliﬁcation,”
he noted that in terms of recruiting former insurgents to serve with the
pseudo teams, the Mau Mau could be divided into three categories.
The ﬁrst was what might be termed the “true believers,” for whom
“the only thing to do was to give him away as soon as possible.”
The second category was those who “had merely joined because all
their friends had done so, and because life was getting rough in the
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Reserve.” In general, Kitson found them unsuitable for the teams.
The ﬁnal category was “the Africans who joined the gangs from a
spirit of adventure.” He found the last group to be the best prospects
for his teams.16
Training―or “taming” as Kitson calls it―of guerrilla defectors for
the pseudo teams involved three phases. The ﬁrst phase involved
harsh treatment of the prisoner, including chaining him and feeding
him only the most basic food. In the second stage, “the candidate
would be incorporated gradually into the community as a friend but
would not be told much about the business nor would he be left by
himself.” Finally, “[h]e could sleep with the others, carry arms, do
sentry duty or go out by himself.” Kitson states that after the system
became fully implemented, the whole process could occasionally be
completed in as little as 24 hours.17
Early operations of the pseudo gangs took place primarily in
settled areas rather than in the “forest.” As the Mau Mau began
being forced away from the population, the pseudo team concept
expanded to longer-term jungle operations, which put much more
stress on the teams.18 They did have some success in their operations,
although it does not appear to have resulted in as much impact as in
their previous operations.
Although most of the pseudo gangs’ activities involved very small
scale operations, they had a deﬁnite impact on the counterinsurgency
campaign. Kitson concluded that by 1954 his teams “had probably
accounted for more actual gang members and weapons than any
of the large military operations in the past six months.”19 Since the
guerrillas operated predominantly in small groups, with problems
in communications between the various groups, the environment
was ideal for pseudo operations.
THE FRENCH EXPERIENCE
The French military in Indochina and Algeria would have seemed
well-placed to use pseudo operations extensively. During the
French campaign in Indochina, about 325,000 of the 500,000 French
troops were Indochinese, giving them a natural base for pseudo
forces.20 Nevertheless, virtually all these native troops were used in
conventional units.
6

The French, however, did establish guerrilla groups based
on native tribal groups. These units, called the Groupement de
Commandos Mixtes Aéroportés (Composite Airborne Commando
Group or GCMA)―later renamed the Groupement Mixte d’Intervention
(GMI) or Mixed Intervention Group―were intended to conduct
guerrilla operations to attack Viet Minh rear areas. The GCMA was
a subordinate element of the Service de Documentation Extérieure
et de Contre-Espionnage (French Counterintelligence Service) in
Indochina. Although relatively effective, the GCMA basically
was a “conventional” guerrilla force rather than a form of pseudo
operation.21
In Algeria, the French used a large number of native Algerian
troops called harkis. In total, over 180,000 harkis served in the war,
a larger number of troops than was ﬁelded by the FLN (National
Liberation Front, the independence group).22 These soldiers generally
were used in conventional formations either in all-Algerian units
commanded by French ofﬁcers or in mixed units. They also were
employed as platoon or below sized units attached to French battalions
in a role akin to the use of Kit Carson Scouts by the United States
in Vietnam.23 Harki units in this third use were designed primarily
in an intelligence gathering role, with some reported minor pseudo
operations in support of their intelligence collection.24 The extent of
these pseudo operations appears to have been very limited both in
time and scope, however.
The most widespread use of pseudo type operations was during
the “Battle of Algiers” in 1957. The principal French employer of covert
agents in Algiers was the Fifth Bureau, the psychological warfare
branch. In addition to other better known French counterinsurgency
measures such as a block warden system and widespread use of
torture to extract information, the Fifth Bureau also made extensive
use of “turned” FLN members:
Among the most specialised stratagems within intelligence-led counter
terrorism was the ploy to reverse the loyalties of captured FLN militants,
so that after being interrogated they worked for French intelligence . . .
[Captain Paul-Alain] Leger [of the 10th Paras] ran a network of former
FLN activists whom he “turned” and sent back into the Algiers Casbah
after “persuading” them to change sides by torture or by threats against
their families. These agents were disguised as street sweepers and

7

municipal workers . . . [and] mingled with the FLN cadres. They planted
incriminating forged documents, spread false rumours of treachery and
fomented distrust among the [FLN] . . . As a frenzy of throat-cutting and
disemboweling broke out among confused and suspicious FLN cadres,
nationalist slaughtered nationalist from April to September 1957 and did
France’s work for her.25

It should be noted that this form of pseudo operation apparently
involved individual operatives rather than organized units as
discussed in other cases. Using individuals rather than teams in this
case may, in fact, have been a more appropriate response since the
FLN inside Algeria by this point was very fragmented in terms of
operational control.26
As with the case of Indochina, rather than trying large-scale
pseudo-guerrilla operations, the French focused on developing native
guerrilla groups that would ﬁght against the FLN. They had some
success with a group in the Southern Atlas Mountains, providing
it with arms and supplies.27 Unfortunately for the French, they also
had a disaster with another group called “Force K.”
In this case, the FLN essentially used pseudo-guerrilla strategies
against the French guerrilla group. Some 1,000 Algerians volunteered
to serve in Force K as guerrillas for the French. Most of the members
of Force K either were FLN members already or were turned by the
FLN once enlisted. Although Force K’s operations initially looked
promising, complete with the corpses of purported FLN members
displayed by the unit, these bodies were in actuality those of
dissidents and members of other Algerian groups killed by the FLN.
Eventually, upon discovery by the French of the sympathies of the
majority of “its” guerrillas, the French army tried to hunt down and
kill its members. Despite French efforts, however, some 600 managed
to escape and join the FLN with their weapons and equipment.28
RHODESIA AND THE SELOUS SCOUTS
The Rhodesian insurgency developed gradually, initially
appearing to be more of a law enforcement problem than an organized
insurgency. It took considerable time for the Rhodesian government
to acknowledge the severity of the insurgent threat it faced and to
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develop a coherent response.29 Ultimately, the government faced two
different major insurgent groups: the Zimbabwe African People’s
Union (ZAPU), together with its military arm, the Zimbabwe People’s
Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA); and the Zimbabwe African National
Union (ZANU), with its military wing, the Zimbabwe National
Liberation Army (ZANLA). These two groups, largely tribal based,
used two very different strategies―ZIPRA focused on conventional
Soviet-style operations, while ZANLA operated under a Maoist rural
strategy. Neither group cooperated with the other; in fact, there were
clashes between the two.
Intelligence operations in Rhodesia―together with overall
coordination of counterinsurgency―remained very complicated.
There were a series of joint operations centers at various levels that
combined the police and the military; in practical terms, however, the
army almost always had the major authority. The senior planning level
was at the Operations Coordination Committee, which combined the
commanders of the army and air force, the Commissioner of Police,
and the Director of the Central Intelligence Organization. As one
study noted, “all decisions had to be reached through an arduous
system of consensus, with each member retaining the responsibility
for ensuring that his service carried out agreed-upon command
decisions.”30
By 1977, in an effort to improve centralized planning, the post
of Commander, Combined Operations (COMOPS) was created. The
Rhodesian security system, however, never did have a completely
uniﬁed headquarters, and overall planning remained somewhat
shaky.31 This was particularly true for Special Forces, including
the Selous Scouts. With the formation of COMOPS, all Special
Forces units were removed from army control. Instead, they were
controlled directly by COMOPS Commander Lieutenant General
Peter Walls. The only role the army headquarters played was to
provide administrative and logistics support. Also, there was no
central Special Forces headquarters, and no Special Forces-qualiﬁed
ofﬁcers were assigned to COMOPS.
A particular gap in Rhodesia’s counterinsurgency campaign
was that of intelligence. Virtually all the effective intelligence being
provided was through the police Special Branch. The military
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intelligence system was very weak throughout the war. In most cases,
units below brigade level had only a corporal for their intelligence
ofﬁcer. At all levels, the job of intelligence ofﬁcer was “. . . to be ﬁlled
by someone not suitable for any other post. It was also considered
the ﬁrst ready-use pool of ofﬁcers and other ranks, should a shortage
of personnel occur elsewhere.”32
Even after the formation of COMOPS, the intelligence system
remained very weak:
. . . [L]ack of a central body for coordinating intelligence at COMOPS also
had a decidedly negative effect on the total intelligence effort. Initially the
section consisted of a single member . . . This neglect had also led to an
almost total lack on military intelligence ofﬁcers capable of control and
co-ordination of intelligence at top level and to the neglect of military
intelligence as a serious challenge at lower level.33

The original impetus for pseudo operations came from
regional joint operations centers rather than intelligence or police
headquarters.34 The main driving force was due to the intelligence
problems already discussed: Field units simply were not receiving
the intelligence they required to respond to the insurgents. Police
made an early attempt to use pseudo operations in October 1966, but
the effort was stillborn.35 The ﬁrst formal pseudo team was formed in
January 1973 as an all-African team, with two African policemen and
four “turned” insurgents. The early teams did succeed in bringing in
some valuable intelligence, but their overall impact was slight.
In November 1973, Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) R. H. ReidDaly was tasked with forming the Selous Scouts as a pseudo-guerrilla
force. Its original membership came largely from army trackers, and
its cover throughout most of its existence was as a tracking unit. The
original strength of Selous Scouts was about 120, with all ofﬁcers
being white and with the highest rank initially available for Africans
being colour sergeant.36 One major recruiting incentive for African
volunteers was that their pay was nearly doubled from their normal
army salaries due to special bonuses.37 Additionally, somewhere
around 800 turned insurgents eventually were recruited, whose
salaries were paid by Special Branch.38 Ultimately, the unit reached a
strength of somewhere around 1,500.
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The original focus of the Selous Scouts was on intelligence
gathering for operational forces rather than acting as some form
of hunter-killer team: “. . . [O]ur pseudo insurgent groups should
only resort to killing insurgents if they had been compromised, or
the prize was so extraordinarily great that it was worth the high
cost of a compromise.”39 Virtually all the intelligence collected by
the pseudo teams was passed to Special Branch, and the “ﬂow of
intelligence from the Selous Scouts to local Army commanders was
very limited.”40
Beyond the internal intelligence operations of the Selous Scouts,
they also began conducting an increasing number of external
operations. These operations involved both intelligence collection
and direct action missions. Much of the impetus for these external
operations came from the Selous Scouts themselves, whose leaders
continued to push more and more for these types of missions. ReidDaly argued that:
External operations, although rarely more dangerous than our internal
operations, always excited interest and enthusiasm in the troops and
proved to be a great morale-booster. They also provided a welcome
break from the general tedium, which often bugged our internal pseudo
operators.41

He also notes that the majority of insurgent casualties caused by the
Selous Scouts, in fact, were created by external operations.42
A number of the external missions were long-range reconnaissance
and surveillance missions, but increasingly included offensive
operations. Selous Scouts originally were involved in an assassination
attempt against ZIPRA leader Joshua Nkomo in Zambia. This mission,
which had to be aborted by the Selous Scouts, later was attempted
by the Rhodesian Special Air Service (SAS); the SAS operation was
a failure. The Scouts conducted regular operations in Mozambique,
Zambia, and Botswana.
In many of these missions, the Selous Scouts would disguise
themselves and their vehicles as being part of the neighboring
country’s forces. Other than this, however, some operations
resembled much more conventional raids than they did covert
operations. The Rhodesian government normally demanded some
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element of “plausible deniability” for these operations―principally
by restricting most direct support air missions―but this political
ﬁg leaf was very minimal. This became increasingly pronounced
as the Selous Scouts conducted larger and larger operations, many
involving large motorized columns launched across Rhodesian
borders.
Most of these missions were very successful militarily, but
their overall political impact was counterproductive. Although the
Rhodesians generally tried to avoid inﬂicting signiﬁcant numbers
of casualties on the soldiers of the countries they entered, such
casualties were almost inevitable. Worse, a few operations resulted
in the deaths of local civilians.43 Even where the Selous Scouts raids
succeeded in striking guerrilla sanctuaries, the political results could
be harmful.44
A good example of this problem was the Selous Scouts’ raid on
a ZANLA camp at Nyadzonya Pungwe, Mozambique in August
1976. Eighty-four Scouts using Rhodesian trucks and armored cars
painted in Mozambique military camouﬂage drove directly into
the camp. Once there, they killed some 1,000 purported guerrillas.
Militarily, it was a remarkable feat. Unfortunately, the camp was
formally registered with the United Nations (UN) as a refugee
camp. Also, even by Reid-Daly’s account, most of those killed
were unarmed guerrillas standing in formation for a parade.45 To
make matters worse, the camp hospital was set aﬁre by the rounds
ﬁred by the Scouts, burning alive all the patients. The international
condemnation of this raid almost certainly outweighed its military
success in the long term.46
Captured guerrillas were critical in the intelligence operations of
the Scouts. The ﬁrst step in potential recruitment of former guerrillas
was in the interrogation process:
For a prisoner to be of any use to us, it was absolutely vital that his
identity was totally protected and that neither the locals in the area of the
contact, nor anyone back at the security force base, knew of his capture
or even of his existence. . . . When a captured insurgent was brought into
a Selous Scouts fort, the ﬁrst priority was to give him the best possible
medical attention available . . . [T]he only things said to him were
concerned purely with his health and physical welfare. The captive was
usually astonished to see that everything had been done to ensure his life
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was saved. And because of this, whether consciously or unconsciously, a
feeling of gratitude would begin to permeate his mind.47

From this point, “in nine cases out of ten, the information just poured
out.”
At times, of course, the captured guerrilla’s usefulness was
expended after the interrogation. In virtually all cases, however,
attempts were made to recruit the prisoners for the Selous Scouts.
The group had an excellent track record in its recruiting efforts. It
developed a speciﬁc routine for “turning” the guerrillas:
. . . [T]he best recruiting method was to send another former insurgent
to visit him in hospital . . . and have a long conversation, dwelling in
particular upon the hardships the insurgents were experiencing in the
bush . . . The process of turning insurgents was eased considerably by the
knowledge that they could be hanged as violators of the Law and Order
Maintenance Act. He would then be examined thoroughly by members
of the Selous Scouts to ensure his loyalty―not to the government of
Rhodesia, but to the members of the unit itself. The insurgent also would
be offered a cash lump sum for joining the Selous Scouts (together with
receiving the same salary as a soldier, with the funds being paid by
Special Branch), and if possible, his family would be moved to the Selous
Scouts base, where they received free rations, housing, education, and
medical care.48

The Selous Scouts were the most important element in providing
actionable intelligence for the security forces, however questionable
the ultimate effects of their external offensive operations. According
to a 1978 study by the Directorate of Military Intelligence, 68 percent
of all insurgent deaths inside Rhodesia could be attributed to the
Selous Scouts.49 With this record, the Scouts emerged as the most
potent factor in Rhodesia’s counterinsurgency campaign.
OTHER PSEUDO OPERATIONS
Kenya and Rhodesia are the two best known examples of the
use of pseudo-guerrillas, but similar techniques have been used in a
number of other counterinsurgencies. The Portuguese in particular
used pseudo operations extensively in their African colonies in the
1960s and 1970s.
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Portuguese pseudo units included the Tropas Especiais (Special
Troops), Grupos Especiais (Special Groups), and Flechas (Arrows).
At their maximum strength, some 11,000 personnel served in these
units, mostly organized in small bands.50 These units, consisting both
of African troops and “turned” guerrillas, generally were intended
for intelligence gathering and were controlled by the Portuguese
intelligence service, the International Police for the Defence of the
State (PIDE).
Guerrilla recruitment was similar to that in Rhodesia, with positive
reinforcement being stressed. In Mozambique, the Portuguese
commander “claimed a 90 percent success rate in persuading
captured guerrillas to turn against their former colleagues . . .”51 In
Guinea, General Antonio de Spinola reportedly evacuated wounded
guerrillas to hospitals before his own troops.52
More recently, the Salvadorans used pseudo teams for intelligence
collection during their civil war. The Turkish government also has
used Special Teams (sometimes called Special Action Teams) in
operations against the Kurdish Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK).
These teams are composed primarily of former army and Jandarma
(paramilitary) ofﬁcers and noncommissioned ofﬁcers. They normally
dress in civilian clothing or PKK uniforms, or as close as the PKK
comes to having uniforms. Apparently, the Special Teams do not
employ former PKK members as part of the teams. Two particular
issues with the Special Teams emerged during the course of their
operations. First, they have been accused of “vigilante justice” in
executing suspected PKK members. Second, team members reportedly
have been recruited heavily from the right-wing Nationalist Action
Party.53
ISSUES RAISED BY PSEUDO-GUERRILLAS
The governments that have used pseudo operations clearly
have viewed them as very valuable. At the same time, however, the
operations that have been conducted have raised a number of problems
and issues. Not all these issues are amenable to easy solutions, but
should be considered when planning such operations.
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Intelligence or Operations?
The two major models of pseudo operations are as intelligence
collectors or as operators for direct action missions. In some cases,
of course, teams have been used for both roles. The main issue for
governments is to determine in which role pseudo teams are most
useful?
The main argument for using pseudo teams as intelligence
collectors is that by virtue of their training and employment, they
are ideally situated for collecting human intelligence. Their ability to
blend with actual guerrillas―at least for reasonable periods of time―
means that they can collect critical intelligence that likely would be
impossible through normal intelligence means.
There are several practical issues involved with using pseudoguerrillas exclusively for intelligence collection, however. The ﬁrst is
the potential difﬁculty of extracting these teams before government
forces act on their intelligence. Second, the longer teams remain in
an area collecting information, the more chance of being unmasked.
Finally, there will almost always be a time gap between the time a
team collects the intelligence and the time other forces can respond,
potentially giving the guerrillas time to escape.
One larger point may militate against using pseudo teams for
routine direct offensive missions. This is the potential political impact
of such operations. It is all too easy for government opponents to
brand the teams conducting these missions as “death squads”
beyond the reach of the law. This certainly has been an issue with the
Turkish Special Teams. Any mistakes in targeting in which civilians
or even unarmed members of a guerrilla support structure are killed
can have severe repercussions for the government. This, of course,
is even further exacerbated if such operations are cross-border
operations, leading to the potential for third country nationals being
killed.
Given the potential political problems with direct missions,
intelligence collection appears to be the preferable mission for pseudo
teams. This, of course, is not completely an either-or proposition.
The teams in Kenya likely struck the right balance: When operating
independently, their primary goal was always to take prisoners
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rather than to inﬂict casualties. Their attitude was that the potential
risks involved in taking prisoners rather than killing the insurgents
immediately were very much worth it in terms of the intelligence
payoffs.
How Far to Go?
A key issue involving the use of pseudo insurgents is how far
they are allowed to go in acting like insurgents. Clearly, unless
the teams are accepted as authentic in a process that Cilliers calls
“validiﬁcation,” they will not be productive (and, of course, can
be killed). On the other hand, their actions in gaining acceptance
typically involve questionable activities.
At times, in fact, their operations have been counterproductive to
ultimate government goals. Reid-Daly notes one particular egregious
case in which a pseudo group conducted a bogus attack on a
protected village. Their initiative so shamed the real ZANLA groups
in the area that they started a regular mortaring campaign against
the village.54 Kitson notes that at times his team members posing as
guerrilla leaders ordered the beating and ﬁning of Mau Maus; in
fairness, however, these normally were for offenses involving the
death penalty under the Mau Mau code.55
The very presence of pseudo teams can potentially destabilize
an area. As these teams enter an area, they must sell themselves as
legitimate guerrillas. Frequently this means conducting propaganda
operations with the local populace. Even without active propaganda,
the presence of “guerrillas” may well create doubts among locals
as to the government’s ability to control its territory and to protect
them.
This is an issue for which there are no pat answers. Governments
should carefully consider the areas in which they insert pseudo
teams and what types of missions the teams are given. Procedures
and general rules of engagement should be worked out in advance
by the headquarters and team commanders. Beyond this, the key
element will remain the training and judgment of the independent
teams.
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Who Should Control Pseudo Operations?
Virtually all the pseudo teams operated to date have been
controlled by either police services―usually in the form of Special
Branch or its equivalent―or intelligence agencies. In the cases of
Kenya and Malaya, this largely was a function of overall British
counterinsurgency doctrine that emphasized the primacy of civilian
control.56 Rhodesia appears to have followed the British model
largely due to its colonial roots from Britain. Other countries such as
Portugal, however, also have used a similar structure.
It is logical to put intelligence agencies or the police equivalent
of Special Branch in charge of pseudo operations. Both police and
intelligence services have experience in conducting undercover
or covert activities. As such, they have gained proﬁciency in such
critical issues as maintaining the security of the members involved,
establishing covert systems of communications, and in general
“tradecraft.”
The principal counterargument, that the teams should be run by
the military, is that most police or intelligence undercover operations
use individuals rather than formalized teams. Militaries are much
more accustomed to handling units than are police or intelligence
services. Also, members of pseudo groups normally will require at
least basic military tactical skills, for survival, if nothing else. The
pseudo units who become involved in offensive operations also are
more likely to need military channels to provide support.
Beyond the tactical level, in many cases pseudo teams have grown
in overall strength beyond the abilities of police services to directly
supervise them. With the Selous Scouts for an example, their growth
to about 1,500 strong and a shift to offensive operations would
have overwhelmed the capabilities of any police service for direct
supervision.57 Even with the smaller number of teams in Kenya and
after their successes, there was a signiﬁcant debate within the British
administration over whether the pseudo teams should be controlled
by Intelligence Branch or the Operations Branch.58
Perhaps the key factor in the historical cases leading to police
or intelligence control of pseudo operations simply was that the
military intelligence systems were so weak. If pseudo teams are to

17

be used primarily for intelligence operations, then their supporting
intelligence system must be capable of rapidly processing the
information they collect. If the military intelligence structure is not
prepared for adequate support of the human intelligence the teams
provide, then some other agency must assume this role.
The ideal solution would be for militaries engaged in
counterinsurgency to strengthen their military intelligence system
to support pseudo operations if required. This would include
augmenting human intelligence coordination and analysis, training
in how pseudo operations might be conducted, and establishing
at least the framework for supporting teams. This likely would be
particularly important if governments use military units as response
forces to the intelligence provided by pseudo teams. Using military
intelligence as the link between the teams and military response forces
provides more streamlined bureaucratic channels for processing
immediate intelligence.
What Type of Intelligence Should Pseudo Teams Provide?
There are several issues surrounding the intelligence provided
by pseudo teams. The ﬁrst is how to handle insurgents who have
been captured as a result of team operations. A particular question
is that of what should be gained from interrogations since this is
typically the ﬁrst stage of recruitment.
There are two opposing views as to the issues surrounding the
use of interrogation of captured insurgents. Frank Kitson notes that
if immediate tactical information is needed, direct interrogation is
required. This must be accomplished by local commanders, who
require detailed intelligence for their tactical operations. On the
other hand, background intelligence for long-term operations is
best achieved by Special Branch. Acquiring this form of intelligence
requires a very different approach: “[T]he chief use of a prisoner lies
in gaining his co-operation and friendship, and a different process,
which takes much longer, is required.”59
Reid-Daly, on the other hand, stressed the absolute criticality of
focusing on immediate tactical intelligence:
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Insurgent prisoners, immediately after capture, provided the best,
immediate and hottest up-to-the-minute intelligence. But the speed of
the acquisition of such intelligence was governed by the time it took to
make the prisoner talk . . . It was important, therefore, that a captive was
speedily broken, and the intelligence gained from him quickly acted
upon. If this did not happen, the security forces gained nothing.60

The same competing approaches can be applied to pseudo operations
more generally. Pseudo teams can provide a key contribution to the
current intelligence picture. The problem of acquiring immediate
intelligence was described well by Reid-Daly:
It is of little use to a soldier to know where the insurgents were yesterday,
or even where they might be tomorrow. He needs to know where they
are now, so that he can do something about it. And this, in effect, was
the fundamental problem―the acquisition of intelligence, which could be
immediately acted upon.61

The opposite approach taken by Kitson is to focus pseudo
operations on developing long-term intelligence rather than
immediate tactical intelligence. In this approach, short-term
intelligence takes a back seat to trying to determine the broader
pattern of insurgent operations. If done well, this can be critical
in predicting future guerrilla activities and preempting them.
Ultimately, this may be of greater beneﬁt in the counterinsurgency
campaign.
A second key aspect of using the intelligence collected by pseudo
teams is how to use this information. The risk of compromise of
operations can be exacerbated by too obvious immediate use of
the intelligence provided by a team. If a pseudo team’s intelligence
reporting of a particular insurgent network results in an immediate
“roll up” of the network, it likely will be apparent to the other side
what has happened.62 This is particularly the case, of course, if such
responses occur repeatedly.
This difﬁculty is a good argument for Kitson’s approach. Certainly,
some high value targets such as key leaders are worth the risk of
exposing the pseudo teams’ operations, but in most cases they likely
are better used for longer-term collection. As with many other aspects
of pseudo operations, governmental responses to their collection
activities must be carefully coordinated so that they can continue
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to operate without being exposed. One technique successfully used
by many teams was to purportedly move out of an area well before
government forces arrived, but to maintain covert surveillance of the
guerrilla forces they had mixed with.
Should Teams be Used to Conduct Psychological Operations?
In Rhodesia, teams would deliberately violate local customs
to alienate the people from the guerrillas. They would also target
members of ZANLA and ZAPRA, pretending to be members of the
other group. Ultimately, this led to some ﬁreﬁghts between the two
groups. Likewise, the Philippine government used similar tactics.
Such operations certainly have had some success. Overall,
however, they likely are not the best use of pseudo teams. Use of
“dirty tricks” can create signiﬁcant problems for governments when
they are discovered. Also, these techniques can create a dangerous
situation for civilians, either directly or as a result of guerrilla reprisals.
There also is the problem of determining where to draw the line; as
these operations develop, the risk of being “overly creative” in new
tricks to try is very real.
Are “Outsiders” Essential?
The insistence of both the British in Kenya and the Rhodesians
in using white ofﬁcers led to practical difﬁculties. Reid-Daly notes
the problems in “blackening-up.”63 In most cases involving contacts
with the insurgents, the white ofﬁcers had to hide outside of the
village or camp in which their African team members were meeting
the guerrillas. In at least one case, however, a team used a white
member as a “prisoner” to gain access to a group of guerrillas.64
Likewise, in Kenya, the presence of white members always
presented security problems. Nevertheless, the mixed race teams
typically faced only limited difﬁculties in “selling” themselves as
Mau Mau despite using relatively primitive disguises.65 In fact, in
one case in which a team unexpectedly encountered a group of Mau
Maus, they successfully explained away the white team member
with them as being an “Asian Mau Mau.”66
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Clearly, most, if not all, of the insistence on using white leaders
for the teams in Kenya and Rhodesia was a result of colonial heritage
and/or racism. In fairness, though, the mixed-race teams seemed to
bond very closely, and all the members were treated well.67 Also, the
guerrillas in both countries seemed to see what they expected to see.
In retrospect, the teams got away with what seems in many cases to
have been remarkably sloppy tradecraft.
Nevertheless, despite their successes in melding the teams, there
seems to be no practical necessity for using such mixed teams. Other
countries certainly have succeeded in using pseudo teams that could
blend with the guerrillas. Portugal, in fact, started with white-ofﬁcered
units, but rather quickly shifted into all-African teams.68 The issue of
using “outsiders” is almost certainly even more dangerous, given
that most insurgent groups likely have become more sophisticated.
There seems to be little practical advantage to using mixed teams.
LESSONS LEARNED
1. Money Counts. In most cases of successful use of pseudo
operations, money in one form or another has been a key component
of the campaign. Cash rewards both for civilians to turn in insurgents
and for insurgents to surrender have provided the basis for the
respective governments to seize the guerrillas. This, of course,
is the ﬁrst step in being able to “turn” them. Rewards for turning
in guerrillas―usually “dead or alive”―were used in Malaya, the
Philippines, Kenya, and Rhodesia.
In a number of cases, reward money was sufﬁciently ample
that guerrilla leaders would turn in their own troops. This became
common enough in Malaya that some government ofﬁcials began
expressing concerns as to the amount of money actually being paid
out to the insurgent leaders.69 In some cases, both cash rewards and
relocation were offered to surrendered guerrillas.70
Besides cash, in the counterinsurgency campaign against the
Huks, the provision of land to a number of the insurgents who
turned reportedly was a very successful tactic. The impact of this
program was more psychological than practical: “As a resettlement
program, The Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) did not
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accomplish a great deal. I doubt if more than perhaps 300 families
of Huks were resettled under that program. But I will guarantee
you that at least 3,000 Huks surrendered. . .”71 The program became
even more restrictive later, limited to only those Huks who actually
participated in operations against their former comrades.
In the larger picture, of course, the use of reward money or other
inducements as tools for counterinsurgency must be done with some
discretion. Originally in Kenya, the British administration offered a
bounty of ﬁve pounds for the ﬁrst small units that killed an insurgent.72
The result was that few live insurgents were surrendered. Similarly,
the use of “wanted dead or alive” bounties is not desirable (except
perhaps for major insurgent leaders) since the odds are good that the
guerrilla will be brought in dead. First, it must be determined if the
person was, in fact, a guerrilla and not simply a personal enemy of
the person seeking a reward. Second, a corpse is of little intelligence
value.
Where the bounty system has worked very well is when it has
been used for getting live guerrillas under government control.
This particularly has been an advantage for pseudo operations. It
is a relatively small step for an insurgent who has turned himself
in to receive a reward and then to agree to actively work for the
government for even more money.
2. The alternative to cooperation can be dire. A pattern among
the successful efforts at pseudo team recruitment of former guerrillas
is that, although the carrot of ﬁnancial rewards is valuable, the stick
of noncooperation can be even more signiﬁcant. Guerrillas who have
not agreed to join have faced the prospect of severe punishment,
including execution. In the case of Kenya, for example, by 1956,
some 1,000 captured guerrillas had been hanged.73 Similar levels of
punishment were present in Rhodesia.
The most interesting factor in this “recruiting tool” is that one
would expect the guerrillas who joined the pseudo units under such
threats to be looking for the ﬁrst opportunity to escape or to betray
their teams. Rather surprisingly, instead they almost inevitably
remained loyal and very effective members of their units. Despite
the large numbers of pseudo missions in Kenya and Rhodesia, there
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were only a handful of examples of betrayal or desertion. The lesson
from both these countries was that, given good leadership and tight
unit cohesion, the ex-guerrillas were every bit as loyal and effective
as the government troops.
3. Coordination is critical. Coordination of the operations
of pseudo teams with other military operations is critical. Two
opposing requirements constantly face the planners of pseudo
operations. If details of ongoing operations are disseminated too
broadly, the odds of leaks leading to disclosure of team operations
are increased exponentially. This clearly can result in team members
being exposed and killed by government opponents. On the other
hand, if pseudo team operations are held too closely, teams can be in
danger from the operations of their own side. This, in fact, occurred
in one operation early in the use of pseudo operations in Rhodesia.74
In June 1978, another team was killed due to an error in coordination
between operating boundaries.75
The principal tool used in deconﬂicting Selous Scouts operations
from those of army and police forces was “frozen areas.” The ofﬁcial
description of how frozen areas would be established read as
follows:
A Frozen Area is a clearly deﬁned area, in which Security Forces are
precluded from operating, other than along main roads. Army Security
Forces already in an area to be declared “Frozen” will be withdrawn
from such an area by the time stipulated in the signal intimating that
such an area is to be “Frozen.” This signal must be acknowledged by
the recipient. The above ruling also applies to all armed members of the
Services and Government Departments with the exception of:
a. Those personnel tasked to operate exclusively along the Cordon
Sanitaire.
b. Those personnel stationed at Protective or Consolidated Villages
and establishments provided with a permanent guard in which
case they are restricted to 1000 metres from the perimeter of such
establishments.
c.

In the event of a vehicle breakdown, ambush, or mine deterioration
on the main road within a Frozen Area, those personnel involved are
to remain in close proximity of their transport.76
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A similar system was used in Kenya in which pseudo operations
were coordinated with district operations rooms. Areas would be
cleared, but reportedly “it was not easy.”77 As with Rhodesia, there
were occasional breakdowns leading to security forces interfering
with the pseudo teams.78
4. Breaking guerrilla communications systems is a key tool. One
common pattern for success in these pseudo operations has been
weaknesses in the communications system of the targeted guerrilla
groups. A key step in preparing the environment in Malaya was
Special Branch’s breaking of the guerrillas’ primary courier system.
This forced them to rely on a slower, more cumbersome system that
was prone to being intercepted by the British.79
Two aspects of the ZANLA command and control system made
the operations of the Selous Scouts easier. The ﬁrst was that the
insurgents did not have radio communications. As a result, they had
to rely on couriers, messengers, and written communications. These
were slow and cumbersome, and enabled the Scouts to break into
the middle of the system.80
The second aspect was that command was very decentralized,
somewhat unsurprising in many insurgent groups. This
decentralization made it easier for pseudo teams to convince
actual guerrillas of their authenticity. It also had a critical impact
on the teams’ ability to impact the guerrilla groups: “In general, the
Selous Scouts achieved less success in penetrating the tighter, more
disciplined ranks of ZIPRA than was the case in the unstructured
command and control groupings of ZANLA.”81
5. Effectiveness of pseudo operations depends in large part on
the effectiveness of response forces. In both the cases of Rhodesia
and Kenya, the practical impact of the pseudo teams was dependent
in part on how effectively military units responded to the intelligence
they provided. Certain units seemed to provide more effective
military operations against the insurgents. Reid-Daly noted the
key aspects of the response troops: “There are three prime qualities
required of a soldier employed in ﬁreforce duties. They are: 1. to be
highly aggressive; 2. to be an accurate snap shottist; [sic] 3. to have
plenty of initiative.”82
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The Rhodesian military developed a special response force to
convert the intelligence provided by the Selous Scouts into military
strikes. The force was called Fireforce, and was equipped with the
few helicopters that Rhodesia possessed; later it also was augmented
with paratroopers.83 The best unit for response in Rhodesia reportedly
was the Rhodesian Light Infantry which worked regularly with the
Selous Scouts.84
Kitson also observed in the case of Kenya that members of the
Kenya Regiment were particularly good at operations since all their
men spoke Swahili and understood the area of operations very well.85
On the other hand, the Kenya Regiment caused some problems for
Kitson’s teams since it conducted some unilateral pseudo operations
designed to kill guerrilla groups rather than using them for
intelligence roles.86
Connected with the issue of response forces is how to coordinate
the removal of pseudo teams once the response forces are called in.
This proved somewhat less of a problem in Kenya since the response
units typically consisted of elements controlled by police. As such,
they normally focused on capturing the insurgents. Nevertheless,
as Kitson noted, when police seized pseudo team members who
had arranged for the guerrillas’ arrests, they “got their share of the
bruises.”87
6. The role of “turned” guerrillas is critical. There are two key
aspects in the role of captured guerrillas who cooperate with the
government and their effect on pseudo operations. First, even if
the guerrillas are not used in the ﬁeld with the pseudo teams, they
are critical in providing current information on how the guerrillas
operate. This can include such aspects as personality proﬁles of
guerrilla leaders, current recognition codes and communications
procedures, and general operating techniques.
Without this current intelligence, pseudo operations have no
chance of long-term success. A corollary of this requirement is that the
government needs a reasonably steady supply of cooperative captured
guerrillas. Most guerrilla groups will change their communications
and codes very regularly as a routine security measure. In many
cases, these techniques will involve relatively low tech methods such
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as special visual signals or dead drops. The absolute best source for
this level of information is a recently captured guerrilla.
Beyond their intelligence value, cooperative guerrillas can be
crucial in training pseudo teams. They can provide details of the
ideological underpinnings of individual guerrillas, details of their
training and customs, and habits in the ﬁeld. In short, they can teach
government pseudo personnel how to think like guerrillas.
The second key use of cooperating guerrillas is, of course, as
members of operational teams. In some cases, it appears as though
government pseudo teams have had some success without using
former guerrillas, but these cases have been the exception rather than
the rule. For all the reasons discussed earlier, guerrilla team members
can be crucial in providing credibility to pseudo teams. If the capture
and subsequent “turning” of guerrillas is handled surreptitiously,
then they can be re-inserted into areas in which they have operated
previously.
CONCLUSIONS
Pseudo operations have proven to be a valuable tool in several
foreign counterinsurgency campaigns. In general, they have been
best suited for collecting intelligence information that would be
difﬁcult to acquire through other means. When used for offensive
operations, the best use for pseudo teams is to capture or kill key
guerrilla leaders. The teams typically have been controlled by police
services, but this largely was due to weaknesses in the respective
military intelligence systems.
In the best situations, pseudo teams can enter a synergistic cycle in
which their capture of guerrillas leads to more accurate intelligence
which in turn results in capturing more guerrillas. Capture should
always take priority over killing insurgents. Whether the captured
guerrillas are used primarily for gaining current intelligence or are
actually part of pseudo teams, their willing and active cooperation is
essential for the success of pseudo operations.
Many of the early pseudo operations look in retrospect to be rather
amateurish in terms of tradecraft. Nevertheless, they worked very
well. It is likely that most guerrilla movements have become more
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sophisticated in their operations; as a result, pseudo teams must also
develop better techniques. The pseudo operations strategy, however,
still should provide major beneﬁts against insurgent groups.
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